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Webs, Walls, and Wars 
 
To say that social scientists and social activists have been greatly impressed by 
networks is something of an understatement. A generation of them already has 
grown up using social network analysis as a primary means of studying social 
relationships and communities and also of organising them for change of the status 
quo.1 At the forefront of such scholarship, Manuel Castells argues that the revolution 
in information technology has given rise to a ‘network society’—a new form of 
organization of human activity, political, economic, and cultural, that is structured 
around new flows of information, wealth, and power.2 Equally easy to understate is 
the degree to which the massive growth of networks has flummoxed governance 
characterized now, say some, by a ‘hollowed-out state… a core executive fumbling to 
pull rubber levers of control’ which no longer work as they once did.3  
 
Through the 1990s much attention in strategic studies was focused upon the ways 
that networking, literally a ‘system of systems’, was set to bring about a Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) which would make wars faster, cheaper, and inherently 
much less chancy for the most technologically advanced militaries of the world.4 In 
the first decade of the new millennium, however, as these same armies found 
themselves mired as with feet of clay fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
scholarship turned to exploring how the benefits of burgeoning connectivity actually 
accrued in equal or greater measure to non-state ‘asymmetric’ challengers.5 Even 
more recently have come analyses of conflict that argue that to varying degrees it 
has become a ‘de-territorialised and globally connected’ affair of transnational social 
movements engaged in discursive ‘wars of ideas’ lacking any permanent physical 
theatre but rather thriving on the ever-shifting network flows of globalisation.6 At 
the same time, the security of digital systems, or ‘cyber security’, has leapt to the top 
of the defence agenda of governments, industry, and citizens.7         
 
Less well observed in the literature on our radically interconnected ‘network society’ 
is that it is characterized just as much by a bewildering and overlapping complex of 
fortifications designed to channel and mitigate or otherwise buttress against the 
cataract flows of globalization. The War on Terror accelerated and magnified these 
developments but it did not create them.8 Nowadays, art, commerce, transport, and 
much of civil life in general are conducted within modern enceintes, new types of 
citadels employing both physical and less tangible digital barriers and control 
mechanisms. For the most part this is occurring organically in a bottom-up manner 
all-too-often akin to unconscious reflex action in the face of perceived threats, which 
themselves stem from the increasing connectedness of the world.  
 
This reflexivity is a problem. In 2006, the philosopher John Ralston Saul argued that 
globalisation, which he perceived above all through the prism of economics, was 
already in retreat and ultimately doomed. Whether this proves true or not of neo-
liberal economics (Ralston Saul’s bête noire), already in security terms we are 
experiencing globalisation’s rebel sting and the inevitable counteraction to it 
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embodied in our architecture. His rumination on the question ‘what comes next?’ is 
germane to this essay. The future, he wrote, will 
 
[…] be decided—a conscious act—or it will be left to various interest groups 
to decide for us, or simply to fate and circumstance. The soundness of the 
outcome will depend on the balance between these necessary mechanisms. 
The most dangerous disequilibrium will have favoured fate and circumstance 
over the other two. The most mediocre, interest groups. The soundest 
equilibrium would be led by conscious public decisions. 9 
 
We are now in the midst of the mediocre but headed toward the most dangerous 
equilibrium. Societies are ‘forting up’ but much of this is driven by special interests—
specifically private capital investors and corporations—and by individual fate and 
circumstance not conscious public policy and strategy.10 Strategic studies are largely 
silent on the issue.11  
 
This paper seeks in a modest way to bolster conscious awareness and understanding 
of the contemporary global trend of fortification, the interaction of webs and walls 
and the challenges that represents to governance, which at present stymies the 
formulation of sound strategies. It will show how fortification today is a general 
phenomenon manifest across the spectrum of conflict. It will critique the theory of 
‘new military urbanism’ which currently dominates thinking on the operations of 
armed forces in the world’s burgeoning and interconnected megacities, as well as 
inadequate for the purposes of rectifying said deficiency.12 It will suggest a different 
way forward that is rooted in the history of why people fortified in the past and the 
sophisticated (albeit neglected for over a century) strategies they employed towards 
the achievement of those.   
 
The larger argument here is that there is nothing intrinsically good about webs and 
network flows or intrinsically bad about walls that aim to regulate flows and mitigate 
their effects.13 World order depends on a considered balance of both. A completely 
‘flat’ world that is frictionless to flows will be characterised by precarious instability 
and extremes of poverty and wealth;14 whereas a completely ordered, demarcated, 
and impermeably walled one will be a stagnant ‘securocracy’ unable to change and 
equally doomed to impoverishment. The issue, as Fritjof Capra put it, is not one of 
‘discarding designed structures in favour of emergent ones… [the] challenge is to 
find the right balance between the creativity of emergence and the stability of 
design.’15 
 
WARFARE TO WALLFARE 
 
It is a commonplace observation that our world today is defined by the seemingly 
ever-increasing network flows of people, things, and ideas. In the early 1960s 
Marshall McLuhan captured the emerging zeitgeist when he heralded the ‘global 
village’ as a result of the rise of global communications.16 By and large this was 
considered a good thing, at the time—indeed it was the key theme in Robert 
Kennedy’s famously uplifting 1968 ‘ripples of hope’ speech.17 But before them both, 
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however, Hannah Arendt perceived a dark side to a world in which ‘every man feels 
the shock of events which take place at the other end of the globe… Technology, 
having provided the unity of the world, can just as easily destroy it...’18 At the time of 
writing these words, just weeks after the massacre in Paris by two French Muslims of 
the satirists of Charlie Hebdo magazine on a self-appointed mission of vengeance of 
the apparently besmirched honour of the Islamic prophet Mohammed, Arendt’s 
apprehension seems rather prescient.     
 
The problem, though, is not simply or specifically one of the effect of connectedness 
as a sort of supercharger of terrorism;19 it is rather a more general and widespread 
problem of tensions and disjuncture across multiple dimensions of the global 
cultural economy.20 It is all too apparent to citizens nowadays, for instance, how 
failures in the subprime mortgage market of the United States led to a global 
financial crisis in 2008 that continues to plague the world economy.21 Or, even more 
literally, how a primarily West African outbreak of haemorrhagic fever could spread 
over the course of 2014 into an international public health crisis that at present 
defies containment.22 No one thinks it odd that the anti-capitalist 2011 Occupy Wall 
Street movement should proclaim itself a ‘leaderless resistance movement’ using the 
tactics of the anti-regime Arab Spring movements to achieve its ends.23  
 
The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has described the prevailing state of affairs as one 
of ‘liquid modernity’.24 A societal response to it has been a proliferation of wall 
building. Israel’s security barrier is only the best known of many de facto border 
demarcating walls now collectively comprising thousands of kilometres of concrete, 
barbed wire and chain-link palisades with ditches, fixed and mobile electronic 
sensors, sentry towers and gate houses that have been built along borders from 
Texas to Turkey in the last decade.25 Internal fortifications have also proliferated 
massively throughout the world at the same time. Blast walls, traffic barriers, 
checkpoints, and physical and electronic surveillance systems surround public 
buildings and transport hubs in cities great and small.26 Meanwhile, urbanites have 
been seeking shelter from the perceived conflict, crime, and uncertainty of city-life 
through gating and wall-building for decades—not only in the United States where 
the phenomenon has been most extensively studied but on every continent and in 
developed and developing nations alike.27  
 
Notwithstanding all this construction, thinking on positional warfare and its 
derivative specialisms—fortification and siegecraft—has progressively fallen from 
fashion since the early modern era.28 Partly, this is on account of Napoleon whose 
perfection of the modern field army established a centuries-long tradition of 
preoccupation in military studies with mobile warfare. Carl Von Clausewitz, the great 
philosopher of war writing in the shadow of Napoleon, had a nuanced appreciation 
of the role of fortresses, describing them as ‘knots that hold the web of strategy 
together’.29 On the whole, however, the lesson taken from this era was that ‘mere 
enclosure and fortification, without any other military preparations’ had had its 
day.30  
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Two things, above all, are driving the current revitalisation of fortification. The first is 
the increasing detachment of the mainstream of conflict from the paradigm of all 
arms, high-intensity, interstate conflict in which unfettered escalation must be 
assumed. During the Cold War, Soviet plans for the invasion of NATO-defended 
Europe intended to deal with vital command and control targets within German 
cities, which could be readily transformed into army-wasting death traps, through 
the eminently sensible (albeit horrific) tactic of ‘nuke and bypass’.31 By contrast, 
wars today are predominantly fought within states under conditions in which the use 
of force is limited, either because powerful belligerents pursuing limited aims restrict 
their own use of the full means at their disposal, or because weak belligerents 
pursuing grandiose aims are restricted by their limited means.32 The second is the 
desire of many states to control population flows, both over and within their own 
borders as well as in external theatres of conflict where they have intervened as 
third-party counterinsurgents in support of local regimes. 
 
In situations where the use of the most powerful weapons is restrained, old 
techniques of positional warfare become viable again. As an illustration, one of the 
least remarked upon but tactically significant military innovations of the last decade 
has been the widespread deployment of the HESCO barrier. Named after the British 
firm that designed it, originally for use on seafronts as an erosion barrier, this is a 
collapsible wire mesh container, available in various sizes, with a heavy plastic liner. 
Cheap to manufacture, easy to transport in flat-pack, and stackable, HESCO requires 
just a few troops with a front end-loader (and plentiful local dirt and rubble) to 
create instant castles proof against the bullets, rocket propelled grenades, and 
improvised explosive devices deployed by insurgents. Recent uses of HESCO systems, 
including its ‘Rapid Deployable Security Fence’ (a robust wire fence which provides 
no ballistic protection but is proof against mobs and vehicle attacks), include:  
 
Fortified compounds in Mali for support of French and local government 
forces, providing stable areas from which to conduct operations’; 
 
Blast and ballistic barriers around high profile venues of the 2012 London 
Olympics, including the 90,000 seat Wembley Stadium; 
 
Perimeter walls and defensive barriers around the headquarters facility and 
other installations of the UNHCR in Dadaab, Somalia; 
 
Two-layered castellation of a power plant in southern Iraq, including a 
lightweight bunker roof, all built over five days; and,  
 
At Gereshk and Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan over 4,000 metres of curtain wall 
with bastions and towers.33 
    
This is hardly an exhaustive list, nor is HESCO the only company providing such 
services, it is rather indicative of a broader industry that is essentially dual-use in 
nature.34 
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More widely remarked upon has been the use of barriers within the context of 
counterinsurgency operations for the purposes of controlling population 
movements, separating, and pacifying warring sectarian communities. Bing West’s 
account of ‘The Surge’ in Iraq in 2007-2008 vividly captured this tactic in recent use 
by the United States:  
 
Inside Baghdad, there was a steady rhythm to American operations, 
somewhat akin to the old Green Bay Packers sweep. Everyone could see it 
coming. Every week, the concrete caterpillars advanced across the city, 
walling people in—or out… With fewer mixed neighbourhoods, it was easier 
to control homogenous districts where any stranger stood out.35  
 
Similar walls, however, have existed in Belfast, Northern Ireland where they were 
erected by the British Army for exactly the same reason—to physically separate 
Roman Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods in order to diminish the tit-for-tat 
violence, score-settling, and provocation which was escalating beyond control. First 
erected in 1969, the ‘peace walls’ have become a permanent feature of the 
landscape. As one local interviewed in 2013 about the twelve foot high concrete and 
steel wall dividing his neighbourhood, ‘If they took an opinion poll of people just in 
this area alone the vast majority would vote to keep it up.’36  
 
Vast controversy has surrounded the use by Israel of similar techniques of 
regimenting human function through the manipulation of urban space. Architect 
Eyal Weizman concludes of Israel’s extensive barriers that they enabled ‘the creation 
of a new geographic, social, and economic reality’ in which the lives of Palestinians 
could be dominated and managed without need for overt violence.37 However one 
feels about the aims to which these constructions are employed, they have proved 
consistently tactically efficacious.          
 
By no means, however, is fortification solely a state-driven activity. Insurgents, too, 
most notably Hamas and Hezbollah in their confrontation with Israel, both Sunni and 
Shi’ite militants in Iraq against the United States, and to some extent Al Qaeda 
fighters in 2002 fighting in Afghanistan, also against primarily American forces, have 
practiced fortification strategies.38 Positional warfare, however, remains on the 
whole rather alien to guerrilla metier—even in the modern urban context where to 
present one’s self as a target to well-trained and well-equipped regulars is to invite a 
grisly death.39 In fact, the most energetic and, in aggregate, extensive developments 
in securitised architecture are those of other non-state actors—individual citizens 
and private corporations—attempting to create defensible space in a world 
seemingly perilously lacking adequate policing and governance.  
 
Not all gated communities exist for primarily security reasons. Critics often virulently 
decry them as the ‘apotheosis of the lifestyle of laissez faire consumer capitalism… 
exemplify[ing] the vision of islands of abundance flowing in oceans of poverty.’40 
There is clearly some measure of truth to this in Europe and the United States where 
class exclusivity is a driver of gating, while at the same time for much of the rest of 
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the world it is an oversimplification. Indeed, in Third World megacities such as Lagos, 
the largest in Africa, gating is becoming the default condition of all classes: 
 
The predominance of gating and its positive reception by local residents 
shows a pragmatic acceptance by most that gating, however unethical and 
imperfect a solution, does provide a way to ‘control’ the perceived, if not 
real, excesses of urban life…41   
 
In the Middle East, similarly, urban residential fortification is burgeoning more and 
more as a result of violent social unrest and as a way of walling off areas where civil 
authorities are no longer able or willing to protect the population.42 ‘Bunkerisation’ 
is also increasingly an aspect of humanitarian relief efforts, in which as one analyst 
has remarked:  
 
The fortified aid compound is more than an unfortunate but necessary 
defensive measure. It is a therapeutic infrastructure allowing for care of the 
self and a necessary refuge from a threatening world that aid workers no 
longer understand or feel safe in.43  
 
In short, ‘forting up’ is a practical, if paradoxical, leitmotif of our densely connected 
age that manifests in a range of modes from the militarily tactical to the broadly 
political as conducted by an equally broad range of actors.   
 
AN URBAN TURN IN STRATEGY? 
 
The urban sociologist Mike Davis in a landmark work on the Los Angeles cityscape 
described this ‘fortress effect’ not as an ‘inadvertent failure of design, but as 
deliberate socio-spatial strategy.’44 Few working strategists have taken up this idea, 
sticking instead to a narrower concept of geopolitics that frames geography as 
‘massively given, substantially beyond near term (at least) alteration by human 
effort’ in contrast with the acute fluidity of politics.45 The problem is that the 
geography of the built environment is not at all static, nor in any sense is it inertly 
apolitical, as philosophers have been remarking ever since the Greeks realised that 
‘the form of the city was the form of its social order, and that to remould one it is 
necessary to introduce appropriate changes in the other’.46  
 
If strategists lost sight of this instrumental property of the built environment, 
geographers and students of revolution certainly have not. As a rule of thumb, the 
two ways of conceiving of the interaction of space and strategy in the literature 
(understood as how power is applied to the achievement of specific ends)47 can be 
identified simply by looking at the index of any particular book: one genre will surely 
mention extensively the nineteenth century Frenchman Baron Georges-Eugene 
Haussmann; the other will almost surely not.48  
 
David Kilcullen, one of the rare authors whose work straddles both genres, archly 
described Haussmann as Emperor Napoleon III’s ‘de facto chief of homeland 
security’ whose brief was the facilitation of the efficient quelling of uprisings through 
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urban design—widening and straightening Parisian boulevards the better to allow 
the rapid movement of cavalry along them, arranging the design and placement of 
its buildings to prevent the easy erection of barricades by mobs, and relocating the 
poor population (i.e., the incipient mob) from the centre of the city to its outskirts 
where it could more easily be controlled.49 Whether this was done ‘consciously and 
intensively’, as is often argued, or as fundamentally an exercise in property 
development with the coincidental effect of opening up the streets to grapeshot 
artillery fire is debatable.50  
 
Kilcullen was a key figure in the design of ‘The Surge’ strategy described by Bing 
West above, a State Department advisor on counterinsurgency of considerable skill 
and renown, and one of General Petraeus’s Iraq War brain trust. He recounts in his 
recent book a conversation with a colleague that caused him to revisit his positive 
feeling that his efforts there—part of which entailed building community-separating 
checkpoints and walls—had forestalled a nasty sectarian genocide only at the cost of 
‘killing the city’.51     
 
There is a grain of truth here, clearly the physical alteration of the flows of any city 
will have an impact on normal social commerce—that indeed is the point of such 
alteration—but it comes thickly wrapped in a layer of overstatement. Several 
objections occur, most obviously that what was killing Baghdad at that time was the 
volcanic eruption of bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and torturing affecting 
hundreds of people per week, which had to be slowed and was slowed as a 
necessary condition of any conceivable more permanent solution. That said 
permanent political solution, whatever that might be, is elusive does not mean 
Baghdad is dead anymore than the continued existence of ‘peace walls’ in Belfast 
forty years after they first went up means that it is dead.  
 
In fact, cities are enormously resistant to ‘killing’ and the flows within them are 
extremely mutable in the face of the most vigorous efforts to affect them. The case 
of the 1992-1995 Sarajevo siege is instructive. One of the longest city battles of 
modern history within a larger conflict characterised by intense sectarian animosity, 
it would not be expected that it would also have involved a high degree of cross-
ethnic collaboration across frontlines that were every bit as intensely barricaded and 
savagely fought over as those of Baghdad. However, this was in fact the case—the 
siege was semi-porous and globally connected to a degree that is not widely 
recognised. ‘War does not simply inhibit trade, as is commonly understood, but 
rather transforms it, pushing it into the shadows and creating new winners and 
losers.’52 The key realisation here is the need not to impose binary distinctions on 
conflicts that defy such simplification—solution vs. no solution, a living city of flows 
vs. a dead one of no flows—and to embrace the messiness of their real political 
economy.53           
 
The underpinning logic of the city-killing overstatement that anchors some analysis 
too far from the shores of commonsense is twofold. First, is the concept of 
‘urbicide’, purportedly a renascent war strategy that targets the ‘destruction of 
buildings qua representatives of urbanity’, which in turn is understood as a condition 
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of agonistic heterogeneity. 54  The problem is that this is a very specific and 
unbalanced, or aspirational one might say charitably, conceptualisation of urbanity 
that elevates plurality—absolutely a condition of the city—above other ‘maternal’ 
imperatives such as security, enclosure, and nurture that are equally vital to urban 
living.  
 
It is more accurate to say, as Lewis Mumford, the great historian of the city, put it 
that: 
 
What happened with the rise of cities was that many functions that had 
heretofore been scattered and unorganised were brought together within a 
limited area, and the components of the community were kept in a state of 
dynamic tension and interaction.55    
  
This state of dynamic tension, between the order and stability of the homogenous 
village and the industrious creativeness of the heterogeneous city, has not gone 
away simply because humans have learned technologically how to construct 
megacities of tens of millions of inhabitants. Push too hard on homogeneity and risk 
stultification a la Pyongyang; push too hard on heterogeneity and risk social 
explosion a la Baghdad.  
 
Which brings us to the second underpinning concept—the idea of a ‘new military 
urbanism. Described by the geographer Stephen Graham, who coined the term, as 
‘new military ideologies of permanent and boundless war that are radically 
intensifying the militarisation of urban life’, one might more generally define it as a 
hypothesised ‘urban turn’ in military and strategic thinking.56 Proponents of the 
theory find evidence in support of the turn, accompanied by ‘racialised right-wing 
anti-urbanism’, in the rapid establishment of what they describe as a ‘shadow 
system of military urban research’ encompassing multiple Western militaries, but 
most notably those of Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom, engaged in 
conferences, workshops, and joint training.57  
 
We do indeed seem to inhabit a new global strategic reality poised seemingly 
permanently ambiguously somewhere on the spectrum between war and not war.58 
It is also the case that there is a community of practice amongst Western militaries 
on the conduct of contemporary warfare that involves a high degree of joint 
enterprise, a shared repertoire of tactics, and knowledge sharing.59 But there are 
also some significant problems with this theory.  
 
For one thing, it is by no means new, as will be explored further in the subsequent 
section. There has been no point in history since the invention of the city in which 
armed forces have not been concerned about war in urban terrain. Moreover, the 
current preoccupation of the United States, as an example, with the increasing 
urbanisation of the future operating environment goes back at least as far as the end 
of the Second World War. In the aftermath of that savage bloodbath, a war that 
marked Europe’s cities with craters, pockmarks, and rubble heaps for a generation 
and more, an American military study found that forty per cent of all Allied resources 
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in the war had been consumed in urban fighting. Looking ahead to war with the 
Soviet Union, it estimated that seventy per cent of resources would be required, 
while noting that the tally would inevitably rise as the growth of urbanisation was 
even then quite apparent.60 
 
From a military point of view urban warfare is a prospect that generally leaves 
generals filled with dread and loathing. The ancient Chinese soldier-philosopher Sun 
Tzu, a great grandfather of strategic wisdom, put the case against it in terms that 
have never failed to resonate in over two millennia since prescribing it only if 
‘absolutely necessary, as a last resort.’61            
 
The trouble is that despite the best efforts of tacticians and technologists since these 
words were written there remains a horrible insuperability to the problem of fighting 
in built up areas. The list of dilemmas that preoccupy current doctrine writers about 
it is long. How to provide command and control in an environment that 
simultaneously breaks up large formations and complicates their communications? 
How to manoeuvre one’s force securely and swiftly in an environment where 
engagement ranges are shrunk practically to point blank? How to develop and 
maintain an intelligence picture of a battlespace that is so irremediably complex? 
How to apply combat power in a way that serves both tactical exigency and the 
overall strategic aim when one’s enemy is intermixed with civilians and fights from 
within the civilian infrastructure?62 It is also the same list that preoccupied their 
forebears, though an argument could be made that the cost in civilian lives was less 
concerning to armies of the past. 
 
New military urbanism seems both impressed and appalled by the apparent practical 
embrace by armed forces of aspects of post-modern critical theory in their 
operations, specifically the conceptual deconstruction of the urban environment and 
inversion of exterior and interior space in a putatively new technique pioneered by 
the Israel Defence Forces.63 A particularly evocative description by an Israeli officer 
interviewed by Eyal Weizman of an attack on the Palestinian town of Nablus 
captures this odd mix of continental philosophy and urban tactics: 
 
This space when you look at it [the interview room] is nothing but your 
interpretation of it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your 
interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion—after all, it must be bound by 
physics, as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do you 
interpret the alley? … We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk 
through, and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window 
as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the 
alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the 
enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want 
to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps.64     
 
As Weizman observes, however, it hardly requires avant garde cultural theory to 
rationalise the tactic of ‘walking through walls…like a worm that eats its way 
forward’.65 Indeed, the insistence of Israeli military strategists in the Operational 
 10 
Theory Research Institute on using such terms did much harm to their cause insofar 
as it freighted a good deal of common sense about war in the built environment with 
a heavy baggage of fashionable academic language that made it incomprehensible to 
those who needed it.66  
 
He argues that rather than a new development in military thinking it represents 
instead a continuation of the pacification tactics of the nineteenth century, notably 
those perfected in the Kasbahs of France’s North African colonies by Marshal 
Thomas Robert Bugeaud and subsequently reapplied (circling back to Haussmann) 
on the streets of Paris where they were used to break the barricades of the 1870 
communes.67  
 
One could just as well, though, point to the tactical instructions given to British 
officers on the Indian frontier through the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, as often as not engaged in what were sometimes referred to as ‘butcher 
and bolt’ campaigns, for exactly the same lessons arrived at independently.68 The 
point here, though, is not a pedantic nothing-is-new, because obviously some things 
are different. The scale, density, and diversity of infrastructure of conurbations have 
grown enormously over centuries of time. Military technology, moreover, across a 
range of categories, the power and precision of weapons, means of command, 
control, and communications, mobility and armour, has also changed enormously. 
But it is in the nature of war that no technological development or tactical technique 
remains permanently advantageous—the tactical or technical adaptation of one side 
is always followed by counter-adaptation on the other. There still are no ‘silver 
bullets’ allowing one to easily wrest control of a city away from an enemy 
determined to keep it.  
 
Not even the advent of air power—also hardly a new development, though a wide 
range of aerial technologies has been developed in the attempt to assert ‘vertical 
security’ since the first military aircraft took to the skies—has fundamentally altered 
the essential challenge.69 Somewhat floridly, but accurately, Davis describes this as a 
‘delusionary dialectic… a sinister and unceasing duet’ in which,  
 
Night after night, hornetlike helicopter gunships stalk enigmatic enemies in 
the narrow streets of the slum districts, pouring hellfire into shanties or 
fleeing cars. Every morning the slums reply with suicide bombers and 
eloquent explosions.70  
 
There is no new military urbanism, nor have the recent efforts of soldiers to conquer 
the problems of old military urbanism proved especially groundbreaking. The cutting 
edge of military science with respect to urban operations has progressed little 
further than the late 1990s United States Marine Corps’ concept of the ‘Three Block 
War’—a metaphor which envisages military operations involving high-intensity 
combat, stabilisation operations, and humanitarian activities taking place 
simultaneously and contiguously, all under the watchful eye of a ubiquitous media.71 
The question of how to keep these blocks practically separate from each other is an 
excellent critique often directed at the prescriptive value of the theory.72  
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A more general one, though equally fatal, is that the numbers just do not add up—
we have a three block war model for a thirty-three thousand block war problem. In 
1957 France succeeded in the Battle of Algiers (though it failed to prevent Algerian 
independence in the end) with a force to population ratio of 1:33; the British Army 
sustained a force ratio of 1:65 in Northern Ireland throughout the 1980s; the United 
States in 2007 managed 1:50 in Baghdad for a period of several months.73 With the 
trend to smaller, more professional armed forces—coupled with an acute reluctance 
to accept heavy casualties—already decades long established, no current major 
armies are in a position to sustain such levels of ‘boots on the ground’. The current 
British Army, for example, by the logic of its own doctrine would struggle to pacify 
even one of its own provincial towns.74          
 
LESSONS OF HISTORY FOR TODAY 
 
Ironically, the best result of the search for a solution to the simple number problem 
of urban operations has been the rejuvenation of the oldest piece of military 
technology of all. As a recent United States Army-funded study of the 2008 Battle of 
Sadr City concluded, the ‘art of reimagining urban warfare’ came down to the 
construction of a wall, which forced the insurgents into an insuperable dilemma of 
either contesting American power directly or being isolated.75 Given the evident 
utility of walls it is worth thinking through their diverse military as well as social, 
political, and economic applications, advantages, disadvantages, and costs. History 
has a great deal to tell us on these points.  
 
For a start, it tells us that what is popularly thought about walls is mostly flatly wrong 
or drastically oversimplified. There is a deceptive uniformity to fortifications—their 
basic, fixed, flat verticality makes walls seem to the casual observer rather like 
another. But walls are not really like each other at all—their apparent isomorphism 
belies a profound diversity of function. In its earliest manifestation, the Neolithic and 
Bronze Age palisades enclosing settlements or religious sites, for example, the 
primary imperative was the provision of refuge. Early pastoralists had to be able to 
preserve their surplus, and more importantly their means of production—tools, seed 
corn, breeding livestock and so on—against the depredations of powerful nomadic 
groups with whom they still shared the landscape.76  
 
One must avoid the descriptor ‘simple’ when speaking of such ‘contained 
communities’ for as much as their defences were rudimentary ditches and ramparts 
(quite often built along defensible naturally existing contours of the land) they also 
reflected complex social and political realities: walls demarcated land, sometimes on 
a large scale; they served as a means of harbouring industry, in which role they were 
integral to the extraction of tax; they had symbolic function impressing passersby 
with the inherent power of the society, which would also have served a deterrent 
function. 
 
Finally, settlement enclosures could be useful for regulating and controlling 
the people within the enclosed settlements and for keeping out undesirables. 
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In this respect, they are an example of how a community’s perceived need 
for security can become a means of curtailing the freedom of the individual.77 
     
There is nothing simple about the above, nor indeed is it a historical footnote lacking 
contemporary relevance—far from it, in fact. There is something deeply atavistic, for 
instance, about today’s controversies over the efforts of governments to achieve 
‘cybersecurity’, rich as these are with compromises and infringements (both real and 
imagined) of the liberty and privacy of citizens.78  
 
China’s ‘golden shield’ censorship and surveillance project, often referred to as ‘The 
Great Firewall of China’, provides a case in point: less a defence against foreign cyber 
attack than a means of shoring up the existing internal political order against the 
infiltration of society by political and cultural ideas deemed subversive to its rulers’ 
interests.79 In a narrower practical sense, however, it might also be said that the 
principle of refuge—the ability to reconstitute one’s productive systems after an 
attack has been endured—is essentially still the master concept underpinning the 
resilience of critical national infrastructure through firewalls, air-gapped systems (in 
other words, a dry moat), and secure backup, amongst other techniques.80   
 
In more developed architectural form (by which is meant featuring a range of tactical 
and increasingly cunning enhancements such as towers with interlocking fields of 
fire, battlements and machicolation, wall shapes resistant to undermining, dry and 
wet ditches, complex gatehouses and portcullises, and so on) fortifications are also 
often described as strongholds. The key difference between this form and the refuge 
is that the stronghold is not just a place of static defence; it is, rather, a base of 
active operations, both defensive and offensive—in other words it belongs to a 
larger concept of war.  
 
The mediaeval castle represents something of an apotheosis of the form, and 
mediaeval strategists were very astute judges of its tactical and operational utility as 
well as its strategic opportunity costs. Its primary function was to dominate and to 
pacify:  
 
The appearance of a castle is misleading. The moat, drawbridge, portcullis, 
and arrow-loops give the impression that the castle functioned within 
bowshot range only. On the contrary, it influenced an area of at least twenty-
five miles radius. Even a footsoldier could cover thirty miles in a day without 
difficulty, and the horseman could obviously manage more. Mediaeval 
soldiers did not sit at home in the barracks twiddling their thumbs. They were 
out patrolling, looking for trouble and frequently making it.81   
  
Again, there is nothing simple about the above and several things that are still very 
relevant. Perhaps the most obvious is that fortification is part of a combined arms 
system that includes, and does not stand apart from, infantry and armour, aircraft 
and artillery.  
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This is an important point in the context of current debates over counterinsurgency. 
Much criticism, for instance, of American efforts to pacify Iraq after the March-April 
2004 invasion and ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime, focussed on the tendency of 
the occupying army to concentrate force in big bases ‘ringed by high dirt walls, 
barbed wire, and watch towers’ to the intense irritation of some ‘who knew that 
classic counterinsurgency doctrine calls for living and moving among the people’ and 
who therefore decried this ‘bunker mentality’.82  
 
The problem, though, is not bunkers per se; it is, rather, a twiddling-thumbs-under-
cover strategy that rests upon bunkers alone to achieve the desired effect. A century 
before the American superpower’s unhappy adventure in Iraq, Imperial Britain 
learned the same lesson in its costly efforts to subdue the Boers in South Africa. 
Ultimately, in order to do so Britain built 8,000 fortified blockhouses, interconnected 
by wire and telegraph cables spread over 3,700 miles, enclosing 31,000 square miles 
of territory, and manned by 50,000 British troops plus African auxiliaries.  
 
On their own the blockhouse lines could not have worked, but Kitchener used 
these now as an adjunct to his military strategy. Between 5 and 8 February 
1902 he set in motion four parallel columns of troops designed to shepherd 
De Wet against the barrier of the blockhouse lines… The combination of 
blockhouses, scorched earth, and great offensive sweeps and drives […] paid 
off. By May 1902, the Boers were exhausted and at the end of their tether. 
For many the peace could not come soon enough.83 
 
The issue of refuge, though, merits closer scrutiny. Mediaeval peasants would not 
have looked to a castle dominating their village as a place of refuge in a time of 
attack any more than villagers today would look at a tank parked in the market 
square as a place where they could hide themselves and their livestock during a 
battle. The mediaeval castle was a fighting machine and what living space it 
contained was for the sustainment of the chieftain, his family, and his soldiers. In 
fact, a feudal lord under threat of siege would as likely as not burnt the hovels and 
fields of the farms around him the better to prevent their use by his attacker.84  
 
The walled mediaeval city, on the other hand, was something quite different. To a 
greater or lesser degree it might have the outward attributes of a stronghold, though 
in practice the sophistication and state of maintenance of its fortifications would 
typically wax and wane in accordance with the degree of threat and availability of 
finance.85 However, it was even more so a place of refuge—or, more precisely, a 
place for civil industry and the ebb and free flow of commerce that was adapted to 
take care of itself by necessity on occasion.  
 
The key theme here is freedom—indeed, it was famously said of the mediaeval city 
that ‘the air of the city makes free’.86 This was no overstatement but it does need 
careful contextualisation. What the fortified mediaeval city provided its inhabitants 
was a degree of what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin called ‘negative freedom’, the 
freedom to act unobstructed by others—in this case specifically unobstructed, to an 
extent, by the feudal monarch.87 In other words, the city wall surely had a tactically 
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defensive function, but its primary purpose was to serve as a physical expression of a 
specific urban identity and a demarcation of a social contract between the sovereign 
power and, for the most part, a wealthy merchant class that had obligations on 
both.88  
 
To be sure, as two analysts have put it, ‘the mediaeval town was also the protected 
town; there was no mediaeval concept of freedom that was not also a concept of 
association, patronage, and defence.’89 We ought therefore to be careful in drawing 
analogies from those times to our own times. That caveat aside, however, there is a 
good deal of resonance here with respect to the contemporary multiplicity and 
fragmentation of sovereignty discussed above in the context of urban gating.  
 
A very interesting example is to be found in contemporary China where the forting 
up of cities is proceeding apace, as elsewhere in the world, because of convergent 
concerns of homebuyers and local government with security. An added dimension, 
though, is the use of gated communities as a prophylactic device allowing a degree 
of political autonomy, or negative freedom, to exist for some sectors of society—
largely a wealthy merchant class—in a way that does not imperil the larger national 
political status quo: 
 
Gated spaces are rapidly becoming discrete units of a new government 
rationale in the cities and their erection is welcomed by residents, private 
actors, and the state. Walls enclosing relatively homogenous clusters of the 
population in well defined spaces are, essentially, forms of classification 
which, in turn, are necessary to the successful administration of a complex 
population.90     
 
A final broad type of fortification is sometimes referred to as strategic defence. 
There is enormous variation in the physical arrangement of this—it may consist of 
individual strongholds positioned to be mutually supportive and to deny an enemy 
unflanked avenues of attack across a wide front; alternately, it may take the form of 
a continuous wall punctuated by other defensive emplacements. The former is 
distinctly more defensively powerful and one sees it in situations such as the, 
ultimately doomed, Crusader Kingdom’s resistance over two centuries to the 
attempts of powerful Islamic armies to retake the Holy Land.91 The latter is visually 
extremely impressive—suggesting its major purpose—but militarily relatively weak, 
hence its most famous instances on the edges of great empires as a bulwark against 
barbarians lacking siege equipment and other means of major war.92 Nowadays, we 
would call such threats ‘asymmetric’.  
  
The defining feature, however, of the strategic defence is its placement, which is 
always on the periphery of the political entity that has created it, demarcating its 
territory and serving as physical testament of the maximum extent to which it is 
determined to exert direct authority, which is not to say that it would not seek to 
exert influence over the lands beyond it. For instance, the roof tiles of some garrison 
houses on China’s northern frontier were inscribed with the words ‘All aliens 
submit!’93 The signage in the customs halls of the major international crossing points 
 15 
of the world today tend to use more emollient language but the message is the 
same. It is also an enormously expensive undertaking—both to build and to 
garrison—and as such always serves as a symbol of the wealth and power of the 
society that created it.    
 
As noted above, powerful land-based strategic defences have fallen from fashion 
since the Second World War, although a handful remain in places such as the border 
between North and South Korea. In the form of air defence, and increasingly missile 
defence, however, they have remained vital to nation statehood for three quarters 
of a century even as they vanished from the public eye into the electronic ether. The 
name of Israel’s rocket interceptor system ‘Iron Dome’ quite clearly indicates its 
conceptual genealogy—a fort in the sky built out of radar emissions and high-speed 
missiles.94  
 
The more recent, and controversial, use of continuous wall strategic defences has, 
strictly speaking, little to do with military defence. Governments of rich countries are 
reinforcing their borders with physical barriers and detection systems, as well as 
naval patrols, border guards, police, and soldiers primarily to prevent illegal 
migration from poorer places. 95  The forces driving this trend are widely 
apprehended, in Europe for example:  
 
Everyone pays grudging homage to the American model of cultural diversity, 
but European governments of all persuasions are dour about its advantages 
and alert to its dangers: cities eroded by poverty and profit; the cantonisation 
of social space; urban and rural societies doubly fractured by ethnicity and 
class; most forms of negotiation dragged along the runnels of identity 
politics. And if governments incline to the gloomy view, so do many 
citizens.96 
 
The narrative of the threat of terrorism has also contributed to the securitisation of 
borders. Also, as noted above, by no means is this a specifically European issue. The 
same perception that physical barriers are the only way to protect one’s own people 
and way of life from a range of threats is the driving force behind the construction of 
the wall between the United States and Mexico.97  
 
Criticism of such activity has centred very tightly around the question of whether or 
not it is ethical, largely concluding (often quite stridently) that it is not:  
 
The existence of a barrier legitimises and exacerbates the dehumanisation of 
the other on the outside… It intensifies the practices of exclusion because the 
barrier, as a material manifestation of inside and outside, reifies the 
difference between a citizen and a foreigner and turns the gaze inward in an 
effort to homogenise the idea of the nation and homeland. By symbolically 
marking the edges of these imagined spaces, the barrier accelerates the 
effort to sanitise the internal space of the state and to eliminate any 
examples of the threatening other.98   
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Surely it is pertinent, though, to ask also: do they work? It is not the first time that it 
has been tried and lessons can be drawn from previous instances.  
 
There is considerable evidence, for example, that Imperial Rome went to great 
lengths to enforce regulations on the movement of people into its empire and more 
generally to police network flows in and around its frontier zones. Indeed, 
archaeologists suggest that the chief purpose of its extensive linear peripheral 
fortifications—notably Hadrian’s Wall in Britain and the limes in Upper Germany—
was not for defence against major military attacks because the lines followed by 
these walls and the placement of its main outposts often defied military sense. The 
Romans were astute engineers and soldiers; if they placed a fortification in a place of 
tactical vulnerability, doubtless it was because they had very good other reasons for 
doing so.99  
 
It is clear from Tacitus and other Roman sources that the job of the army on the 
frontier was essentially border control and its purpose in a word: security.100 
Ultimately, of course, the frontiers failed to deliver in this respect because Rome 
itself failed to complete the conquest of the known world—the only way of 
achieving total security that the expansionist early emperors wished to imagine; but 
they certainly gave several centuries of good use allowing the peaceful economic 
exploitation of the adjacent countryside within the empire right up to the end.101  
 
The larger point, though, is about how we conceive of walls and the frontiers that 
they serve. None of the walls forms discussed here is impermeable, even in those 
situations where their primary intent was militarily defensive. Impermeable, 
permanently unbreachable walls are the stuff of fantasy, like the 700 feet high and 
300 miles long ice wall in the Song of Ice and Fire novels—and even there they still 
fail.102 Walls are better conceived as valves—a means of regulating flows by the 
manipulation of the physical terrain for the purposes of policy. Whether that 
requires flow through the valve to be set to fully on, or to fully stopped, or 
somewhere in between those absolutes depends on the aim of the policy; the valve 
is a means to an end—and generally a good one to have.    
 
A MORAL AND NATURAL CASE FOR WALLS 
 
People build walls because they are fearful. They build walls when they want to 
pacify and subdue others. They build walls to preserve material and political 
conditions inside them that are massively better than those that prevail outside 
them. It is hard to construct a case for walls that is morally good, even though they 
are absolutely practically good for those things. It is quite easy to adopt the self-
aggrandising jeremiad tones of Colonel Nathan Jessup:  
 
Son, we live in a world that has walls, and those walls have to be guarded by 
men with guns…You don’t want the truth because deep down in places you 
don’t talk about at parties, you want me on that wall, you need me on that 
wall.103   
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In his moving account of his journey along many of the contemporary walls noted in 
this paper the Canadian travel writer Marcello Di Cinto concluded of them that they 
represented a sort of surrender:  
 
The walls stood as evidence that their conflicts were unwinnable and 
permanent. When diplomacy and negotiation crumbles, when the motivation 
to find solutions wanes and dies, when governments resign themselves to 
failure, the walls go up… The walls admit our defeat. We throw up a wall right 
after we throw up our hands.104 
   
Nonetheless, there is a practical and moral case for walls that goes beyond the self-
evidently perennial attraction of communities to them for varying self-serving 
reasons throughout history. The truth is that our world today is typified by the 
prevalence of conflicts, perhaps better described as ‘confrontations’, that are 
effectively irresolvable and which cycle through periods of dormancy and flare up.105 
Is it immoral to treat the symptoms of a chronic disease? If not, why then should the 
use of walls to mitigate the mutual violence suffered by otherwise warring 
communities be considered so? More generally as Michael Walzer put it:  
 
Membership is important because of what the members of a political 
community owe to one another and to no one else, or to no one else in the 
same degree. And the first thing they owe is the communal provision of 
security and welfare.106 
   
If one accepts that political community is desirable and that a just social contract 
within it depends in part on the recognition of difference between members and 
strangers, then the exclusionary function of walls is not ipso facto immoral.  
 
Natural history also suggests a positive case for walls in world affairs.107 Circling back 
to the introduction of this paper, we can observe that people want to be connected 
with others. The reason that we have wired the world up in as dense a web as we 
have done (and are continuing to do) is because people find links with others to be 
empowering, enriching, and enjoyable.108 There are, on the other hand, aspects of 
wild connectivity that people find disempowering, impoverishing, and frightening, 
which compels them to cover up and wall themselves off. Our global system 
currently reflects these contrary imperatives. It is a massively complex system that is 
struggling to achieve what the cyberneticist Norbert Weiner described as 
‘homeostasis’ or self-regulation.109  
 
The academic literature, where it touches on the issue in the first place, tends to 
perceive walls as part of the problem but it should not—because they are actually a 
part of the solution. It helps to present the problem as one that afflicts all potentially 
emergent highly connected systems—brains, cities, software, and society more 
generally. Even Di Cinto, who as noted above paints a bleak picture of our walled 
world, apprehends something natural to what is happening:  
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Perhaps new walls are not anathema to our borderless world but the natural 
response to it. We are uncomfortable being so undefined. We need to put 
something, anything, under our control. So we counter economic and 
electronic entropy with simple geometries of bricks, barbed wire, and 
steel.110 
 
The issue at hand is the surfeit of positive feedback mechanisms in the system—
stimuli such as terrorism, for example, that are self-reinforcing cause one event to 
lead to another and after every iteration of the cycle subsequent stimuli are 
amplified. The result is an ever-widening gyre: feedback—chaos—from which people 
naturally recoil. The problem is one that affects all complex networks. In the brain, 
which relies on the constantly reverberating circuits of billions of interconnected 
neurons to produce consciousness, the inevitable ruckus of positive feedback that 
would otherwise drive us all into the equivalent of a permanent epileptic fit, is dealt 
with by a simple expedient: negative feedback, fatigue (or in more resonant military 
terms, friction)… 
 
Every neuron in the brain suffers from a kind of regulated impotence: after 
firing for a stretch, the cell must go through a few milliseconds of inaction, 
the ‘absolute refractory period’, during which it is immune to outside 
stimulation. Along with many other ingenious inhibiting schemes that the 
brain relies on, fatigue is a way of shorting out the reverberating circuit, 
keeping the brain’s feeding frenzy in check.111        
 
That is the thing, the ‘inhibiting scheme’, the device that generates the ‘absolute 
refractory period’ that allows you to comprehend these words (and to disagree with 
them, if you wish), is a wall, a fortification, a semi-permeable membrane—a valve, a 
machine for slowing. The same goes for our larger human collectivity. Who does not 
want a global society that is governable, that can direct itself towards a better and 
more stable and creative future? That person should wish for a world without walls.     
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